




THE NCAA AS STATE ACTOR:   
TARKANIAN, BRENTWOOD, AND DUE PROCESS 
JAMES POTTER†
 
The NCAA would like the American public to believe that only a few schools ever 
break the rules, and it is never one of their golden programs.  But other than mak-
ing billions off of unpaid kids, has the NCAA ever made you confidently think 
they know anything about anything? 
 Former college basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian1
It almost seems impossible that, in the freest country in the world, we tolerated an 
organization like the NCAA.  Is it because we were indifferent, intimidated, unin-
formed, selfish, loyal to the system, left out, or didn’t know how to change a system 
that has failed in its mission? 
 Former college basketball coach Dale Brown2  
If the NCAA and those who lead at the institutional and conference levels are un-
able to maintain academic values in the face of economics and related pressures, 
the government may be less than a proverbial step away. 
 Law professor Rodney K. Smith3
 
Formed one hundred years ago at the behest of President Theo-
dore Roosevelt,4 the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
†  J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Ph.D. 1998, North-
western University; M.A. 1989, University of North Carolina; B.S. 1985, Ohio Univer-
sity.  I would like to thank Professors Ted Ruger, Nate Persily, and Seth Kreimer for 
their help in providing focus early in my writing process.  Thanks are also due to my 
Comment Editors and other colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.  
And finally, thanks to my wife, Kirsten Potter, for her abundant encouragement, pa-
tience, and passion for college basketball, all qualities that I have come to expect from 
her.  I have received help from many, but all errors are my own. 
1 JERRY TARKANIAN WITH DAN WETZEL, RUNNIN’ REBEL:  SHARK TALES OF “EXTRA 
BENEFITS,” FRANK SINATRA, AND WINNING IT ALL, at xvi (2005). 
2 Dale Brown, Foreword to DON YAEGER, UNDUE PROCESS:  THE NCAA’S INJUSTICE 
FOR ALL, at vi (1991). 
3 Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role 
in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 22 (2000). 
4 See JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNI-
VERSITY:  A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT’S PERSPECTIVE 70-71 (2003) (noting President Roo-
sevelt’s concerns regarding the injuries suffered by college athletes, and his support for 
“the principle of amateurism”); see also YAEGER, supra note 2, at 1-6 (describing how a 
single on-field death-–one of eighteen suffered by college football players during the 
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exists today “to govern competition in a fair, safe, equitable and 
sportsmanlike manner, and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into 
higher education so that the educational experience of the student-
athlete is paramount.”5  The NCAA is a private organization, made up 
of over one thousand active member institutions—colleges and 
universities representing widely divergent student bodies, educational 
missions, and athletic budgets.6  Over the last three decades, due in 
large part to the growing popularity of college sports on television,7 
the NCAA has become increasingly powerful, such that the degree to 
which it now serves its own stated purpose regarding the “paramount” 
nature of the educational experience may be seriously questioned.8  
Because of its private status, however, NCAA enforcement 
proceedings are not governed by the kinds of constitutional 
protections to which federal, state, and local governments must 
adhere.  No matter how ubiquitous the NCAA has become, and no 
1905 season–-became a well-publicized spur toward rules reform, including the adop-
tion of the forward pass). 
5 NCAA, Our Mission, http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/about_ncaa/overview/ 
mission.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
6 See NCAA, Composition of the NCAA, http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/ 
membership_svcs/membership_breakdown.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) (noting 
that, as of December 1, 2006, the total membership count was 1279 institutions, includ-
ing conference and affiliated members).  An estimated 384,742 student-athletes cur-
rently participate in NCAA-governed intercollegiate athletics.  NCAA, Fact Sheet, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
7 See, e.g., Darren Rovell, Once an Afterthought, the Dance Is Now Big Business, 
ESPN.COM, Oct. 10, 2005, http://proxy.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2186638&type=story 
(noting that rights to telecast the NCAA Division I basketball tournament—now popu-
larly known as “March Madness” or “The Big Dance”—that sold for less than $1.2 mil-
lion in 1973, now bring in an average of $545 million per year to the NCAA, leading to 
an increase in its operating budget from $21 million in 1989-1990 to $480 million in 
2004-4-2005).  See generally The NCAA and Conference Affiliation, in THE BUSINESS OF 
SPORTS 459-67 (Scott R. Rosner & Kenneth L. Shropshire eds., 2004) (breaking down 
recent NCAA budgets by sport, conference, source of revenue, and more).  For further 
information regarding the economic impact of the NCAA, see infra notes 139-141 and 
accompanying text. 
8 The threat of federal intervention in the operations of the NCAA has recently 
become more salient.  See, e.g., Pete Thamel, Brand Defends N.C.A.A. Tax Status, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at D4 (recounting NCAA President Myles Brand’s effort to de-
fend the Association’s tax-exempt status in light of “corporate sponsorships, lucrative 
TV deals and coaches with lavish contracts and no academic duties”); Editorial, College 
Sports Get a Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at A20 (commenting on a recent “tough-
minded letter” to the NCAA from the House Ways and Means Committee, seeking ex-
planation of how athletic departments, some with budgets “growing two to three times 
faster than higher education as a whole,” function on campuses across the country).  It 
is an open question whether the new Democratic majorities in Congress may prove 
more demanding of explanations regarding the NCAA’s academic mission. 
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matter how much is at stake in its rulings, in some ways the NCAA 
remains untouchable by even the most basic requirements of fairness 
that our legal system has embraced.  This Comment asks whether, at 
its most fundamental level, such an arrangement makes any sense.  As 
the opening quotations imply, the answer offered here is a resounding 
“no.” 
For a private organization like the NCAA to be bound by 
Fourteenth Amendment standards of due process, the organization 
must be deemed a “state actor” for constitutional purposes.9  While 
the United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that the NCAA 
does not qualify as a state actor,10 this Comment will argue that the 
Court’s decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian warrants reevaluation,11 and 
that there are a number of reasons why the NCAA should be held to 
the same due process standards that apply to governmental 
organizations.12
Part I traces the history of state action doctrine, from its birth in 
the post-Civil War era through its expansion under the Warren Court 
and eventual retraction during the Burger/Rehnquist years.  This is 
9 See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
885-926 (15th ed. 2004) (delineating key moments in the evolution of “state action” 
from 1883 to the present day). 
10 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988). 
11 Because this Comment argues for an adjustment away from Supreme Court 
precedent, issues of stare decisis must be acknowledged.  However, as will become 
clear throughout the Comment, the Court has employed so many different tests and 
standards to assess state action that the doctrine itself has proven to be unusually pli-
able and fact dependent.  The change I advocate is one of degree, not of kind, and it is 
my contention that the Court could move further toward a flexible, case-by-case ap-
proach without necessarily overruling prior holdings. 
12 While this Comment differs from previous work by explicitly calling for a revi-
sion of the doctrine expressed in Tarkanian in light of Brentwood Academy vs. Tennessee 
Secondary School Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), legal scholarship has addressed the state 
action question as it applies to athletic associations.  See, e.g., Megan M. Cooper, Note, 
Dusting Off the Old Play Book:  How the Supreme Court Disregarded the Blum Trilogy, Re-
turned to Theories of the Past, and Found State Action Through Entwinement in Brentwood 
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 913, 
951-62 (2002) (tracing state action doctrine from Tarkanian through Brentwood); Lisa 
Mastrogiovanni, Casenote, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Ath-
letic Association, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 711, 728-40 (2002) (providing a close 
reading of the majority and dissent in Brentwood); Robin Petronella, Comment, A 
Comment on the Supreme Court’s Machiavellian Approach to Government Action and the Impli-
cations of Its Recent Decision in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Ath-
letic Association, 31 STETSON L. REV. 1057, 1072-81 (2002) (discussing Brentwood and 
ultimately criticizing it as an overextension of the state action doctrine). 
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not a well-settled area of the law,13 and at least two distinct notions of 
how to determine what constitutes state action survive to the present 
day.14  Part I further develops these dueling conceptions, examining 
their underlying premises to identify the interests served by each.  Part 
II looks closely at two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions-–
NCAA v. Tarkanian15 and Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic Ass’n16-–and argues that the line of reasoning adopted by 
the Court with respect to a state high school association in Brentwood 
should be applied to the NCAA’s behavior on the intercollegiate level, 
and is therefore preferable to the reasoning employed in Tarkanian.  
Part III concludes by advancing substantive justifications for holding a 
private association like the NCAA to standards of fundamental 
fairness. 
I.  STATE ACTION DOCTRINE THROUGH THE YEARS 
A.  A Restrictive Beginning 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution provides, in part, that “[n]o State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”17  This provision 
came into play in the Civil Rights Cases,18 in which the Supreme Court 
invalidated sections of the Civil Rights Act of 187519 by expressly 
13 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“[O]ur cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the 
state have not been a model of consistency.”); Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, 
Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 25 (2004) (“As modern state 
action doctrine has made all too clear, exactly where the line between private and pub-
lic is to be drawn is, at best, elusive.”). 
14 See Martin A. Schwartz, New Issues Arising Under Section 1983, 18 TOURO L. REV. 
641, 646 (2002) (describing two strands of state action jurisprudence—one structured 
according to tests, the other more ad hoc in nature—the unpredictability of which 
“puts litigators and lower court judges in a very difficult position”).
15 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
16 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause adds that a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  Id. 
18 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
19 Ch. 14, 18 Stat. 335.  The Civil Rights Act of 1875 had been passed, in part, to 
provide equal access to public accommodations for newly freed slaves.  “The [Civil 
Rights Cases] grew out of exclusions of blacks from hotels, theaters and railroads.”  
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holding Fourteenth Amendment protections to be valid only against 
state actors.20  At its most basic level, the decision shielded admittedly 
“wrongful” acts from due process and equal protection requirements, 
so long as the acts were committed by private entities, not by an arm 
of the government.  The Court reached this decision over a stinging 
dissent by Justice Harlan, who asserted, inter alia, that places of public 
accommodation are state actors: 
In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and 
managers of places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities 
of the State, because they are charged with duties to the public, and are 
amenable, in respect of their duties and functions, to governmental 
regulation.
21
Despite Justice Harlan’s prescient argument, which was nearly a 
century ahead of its time in terms of eventual Supreme Court rulings 
regarding public accommodations,22 in the Civil Rights Cases the Court 
adhered to a restrictive conception of state action.  This was arguably 
due at least in part to the immediate post-Civil War historical context, 
in which issues of federalism were particularly salient.  But while the 
racial issues at the heart of the Reconstruction era found the Court 
guarding against excessive federal involvement, in the twentieth 
century racial discrimination would become a catalyst for the expansion 
of state action doctrine.23
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 888. 
20 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17 (“[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed 
by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts 
of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial 
or executive proceedings.”). 
21 Id. at 58-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
22 In the aftermath of the Court’s landmark school desegregation decision Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a series of cases eventually ruled that public 
accommodations could not be divided along racial lines.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 
373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (observing in 1963 that it was “no longer open to 
question that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities”). 
23 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 892 (“Most of the [state action] cases 
from the 1940s to the 1960s involved claims of racial discrimination (and most found 
the 14th Amendment applicable).”). 
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B.  The Doctrine Expands 
1.  “Public Function” Analysis 
In the so-called “White Primary Cases,”24 the Court prohibited 
political parties, and states themselves, from limiting participation in 
primary elections on the basis of race.  While these cases more directly 
implicated the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on race 
discrimination in the voting context,25 they extended Fourteenth 
Amendment protections as well.  This is especially true of state efforts 
to delegate power to nongovernmental parties:  after the White 
Primary Cases, states could no longer achieve impermissibly 
discriminatory goals simply by giving a private actor authority to 
perform a public function that is governmental in nature.  By invalidating 
such efforts, the Court proved willing to extend Fourteenth 
Amendment protections even when a strict, formalist approach might 
have allowed for the opposite result.  Subsequent cases have often 
turned on the question of whether a given function in a particular 
case was deemed to be “public” or “governmental.” 
In Marsh v. Alabama,26 the Court followed the spirit of Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases by holding that the town of 
Chickasaw, Alabama, which was owned by a shipping corporation, 
could not prohibit a Jehovah’s Witness from distributing religious 
literature, because that violated the First Amendment guarantee of 
religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause.27  In extending the 
public function prong28 within state action doctrine, the Court in 
Marsh held that “[o]wnership does not always mean absolute 
dominion.  The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his 
24 These cases include Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (holding that 
the Democratic Party’s exclusion of blacks from its primary constituted racial discrimi-
nation by the State of Texas); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944) (holding that 
the power to determine qualifications for participation in elections is a state function 
and that anyone who exercises it, though in the guise of a private party, is in reality an 
agent of the state); and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring) 
(declaring that a private party may not control “the uncontested choice of public offi-
cials” without adhering to state action safeguards). 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 provides:  “The right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 
26 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
27 Id. at 508.  Under the Free Exercise Clause, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
28 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 894-901. 
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property for use by the public in general, the more his rights become 
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who 
use it.”29  In Marsh, the Court conceptualized town ownership as a 
governmental function; this characterization brought First 
Amendment rights into play, even though the town was owned by a 
private corporation.  This is the paradigm for public function analysis 
of state action:  private entities that act in ways and for purposes 
typically associated with governmental functions are held to the same 
constitutional standards as government entities themselves. 
2.  “State Nexus” Analysis 
Two terms after Marsh, the Court further extended its concept of 
state action in Shelley v. Kraemer,30 in which Chief Justice Vinson’s ma-
jority opinion held that, while it may not be unlawful for private indi-
viduals to enter into racially restrictive housing covenants,31 the State 
may not enforce such covenants, because to do so would constitute state 
action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.32  While private 
discrimination remained beyond the scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections, Shelley remade the dividing line between private and 
public, so that a private agreement, though in and of itself permissi-
ble, could become unconstitutional when enforced if the agreement 
in question relied sufficiently upon the government for its enforce-
ment.  That a state’s mere “involvement” in a private agreement 
could, in some circumstances, lead to state action represented a broad 
extension of the doctrine.33
Because of Shelley’s far-reaching implications, scholars have sug-
gested that the case cannot be read literally for precedential purposes, 
and that it was probably decided in such broad terms because the par-
29 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506. 
30 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
31 “[The Fourteenth] Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, 
however discriminatory or wrongful.”  Id. at 13 (citations omitted). 
32 See id. at 19 (finding “no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in 
the full and complete sense of the phrase” and that “but for the active intervention of 
the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have 
been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint”).  Future Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, who would become a committed expansionist in terms of state 
action doctrine upon his ascendance to the Court, served as co-counsel for the peti-
tioners in Shelley.  Id. at 2. 
33 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 903 (“Some seemingly ‘neutral’ state 
nexus with a private actor can almost always be found:  at least by way of the usual state 
law backdrop recognizing exercises of private choices.”). 
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ticular practices in the cases before the Court were especially objec-
tionable.34  Nonetheless, Shelley represented a further example of the 
Court expanding its conception of state action in order to combat dis-
criminatory practices at the state level. 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority35 provided another such ex-
tension of the state action doctrine, this time at the local level.  In Bur-
ton, a municipal parking garage in Wilmington, Delaware, leased 
space to a restaurant.  When that restaurant refused to serve African-
American patrons, a lawsuit was filed under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36  The Supreme Court of 
Delaware held that the restaurant was acting in “a purely private ca-
pacity,”37 and was therefore insulated from equal protection require-
ments.  But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that ruling, relying on 
the symbiotic relationship between the city-owned garage and the dis-
criminatory behavior of its lessee, the restaurant.  Emphasizing the 
need to look at “the peculiar facts or circumstances present” in each 
case, the Court held that “when a State leases public property in the 
manner and for the purpose shown to have been the case here, the 
proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with 
by the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants writ-
ten into the agreement itself.”38
Burton’s recognition that the precise boundaries of state action are 
necessarily fact-specific determinations—the Court called the act of 
defining those boundaries an “‘impossible task’ which ‘[t]his Court 
has never attempted’”39—marks it as perhaps the zenith of a progres-
sive conception of state action.  Here the Court took a close look at 
the totality of the circumstances involved and determined that Four-
teenth Amendment protection was appropriate, even though, as in 
Shelley before, the connection between the discriminating party and 
the state itself was arguably somewhat tenuous.  With Burton, the 
34 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 527-
29 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the breadth of Shelley’s logical implications, but noting 
that “the Court only rarely has applied Shelley as a basis for finding state action”). 
35 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
36 See id. at 716. 
37 Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894, 902 (Del. 1960), rev’d, 365 
U.S. 715 (1961). 
38 Burton, 365 U.S. at 726. 
39 Id. at 722 (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 
(1947)). 
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Court extended the state action doctrine as far as it had ever gone be-
fore, and further than it has ventured since.40
State nexus analysis in cases like Shelley and Burton provided the 
mechanism for the Court to extend protection against racial discrimi-
nation, moving closer to the ideal for which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was passed in the first place.  Historically speaking, these two 
cases fit within the gradual, halting movement toward racial equality 
that characterized much of American social and political life in the af-
termath of World War II. 
C.  The Conservative Retrenchment 
The end of Chief Justice Warren’s tenure marked an ideological 
turning point for the Supreme Court on several fronts.  President 
Nixon’s appointment of Chief Justice Burger in 1969 and, especially, 
of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in 1972, ushered in an era of back-
lash against some of the Warren Court’s more progressive holdings.  
In the state action realm, cases like Shelley and Burton remained on the 
books; however, the Court would soon begin to narrow its definition 
of state action. 
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,41 the Court declined to find state 
action in the case of a private club’s racially discriminatory policy.  In 
rejecting the argument that the club’s state-granted liquor license was 
sufficient to bind the private actors to Fourteenth Amendment stan-
dards of equal protection, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the 6-3 majority: 
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise 
private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the pri-
vate entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or 
if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever.  Since state-
furnished services include such necessities of life as electricity, water, and 
police and fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the 
distinction between private as distinguished from state conduct set forth 
in The Civil Rights Cases . . . and adhered to in subsequent decisions.
42
40 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 251 (1985) (characterizing 
Burton as “the high-water mark in a tide of state action doctrine that has since been al-
most constantly at ebb”). 
41 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
42 Id. at 173.  The majority in Moose Lodge included all four of President Nixon’s 
new appointees, with Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Blackmun join-
ing Justice Rehnquist’s opinion.  Id. at 164. 
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The opinion, which explicitly distinguished both Shelley and Bur-
ton,43 remains bound in spirit to the Reconstruction-era cases from 
nearly a century before.  The refusal to insist on precise criteria to de-
fine state action had allowed the more progressive Vinson and Warren 
Courts to extend the doctrine, whether via public function or state 
nexus analyses, as circumstances dictated.  In Moose Lodge the Court 
embraced a mirror-image approach, limiting the scope of state action 
and ruling in a more restrictive manner.  By reclaiming additional turf 
on the “private” side of the public/private divide, Moose Lodge raised 
the bar on the state nexus prong of state action doctrine:  connections 
between the private actor and the state would now have to be more 
substantial in order for Fourteenth Amendment protections to apply.  
While the landmark extensions of the previous decades may not have 
been overturned, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts would prove 
much more likely to absolve private actors from constitutional re-
quirements.  The fact-specific approach that previously led to an ex-
pansion of the state action doctrine was now being employed to rein it 
in. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing again for the same 6-3 majority as in 
Moose Lodge, continued this process of distinguishing expansionist 
precedents while embracing restrictive ones in Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co.44  As the above quote from Moose Lodge explicitly antici-
pated, the majority in Jackson found that a private supplier of electric-
ity was not a state actor.45  Rejecting the argument that, because elec-
tricity is an essential item, the termination of its service must meet due 
process restrictions, Justice Rehnquist summarized the Court’s hold-
ing: 
All of petitioner’s arguments taken together show no more than that 
Metropolitan was a heavily regulated, privately owned utility, enjoying at 
least a partial monopoly in the providing of electrical service within its 
territory, and that it elected to terminate service to petitioner in a man-
ner which the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission found permissible 
under state law.  Under our decision this is not sufficient to connect the 
State of Pennsylvania with respondent’s action so as to make the latter’s 
conduct attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
46
43 Id. at 172. 
44 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
45 Id. at 358-59. 
46 Id. at 358. 
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Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued that the majority failed to take 
a cumulative look at the facts, which pointed to “a monopolist provid-
ing essential public services as a licensee of the State and within a 
framework of extensive state supervision and control.”47  Indeed, Jack-
son was arguably a case in which the private actions were “sufficiently 
intertwined with those of the State”48 to an even greater degree than 
in both Shelley and Burton.  The state action doctrine was now being 
reargued almost completely anew, with only cursory attention paid to 
its development over the previous century; the Civil Rights Cases 
seemed to provide the only precedent that the Burger Court was un-
willing to distinguish.  Justice Marshall’s Jackson dissent, which com-
plained of the majority’s unwillingness to add together the various fac-
tors that might lead toward a finding of state action, would prove 
prophetic:  “Today the Court . . . adopts a stance that is bound to lead to 
mischief when applied to problems beyond the narrow sphere of due 
process objections to utility terminations.”49
Whereas prior to Jackson the Court seemed to look at the totality 
of circumstances in assessing whether state action should be imputed 
in a given case, two decisions handed down on the same day in 1982 
found the Court replicating its “sequential” Jackson-style analysis.50  In 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,51 the Court considered whether a private 
school’s discharge of certain employees fell under the purview of 
Fourteenth Amendment protections.  Despite the facts that ninety 
percent of the school’s operating budget came from the government, 
the school was subject to extensive state regulation, and it served a 
public function by educating maladjusted students, the Court ruled 
that those discharged by the school were not entitled to constitutional 
standards of due process.52
In Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court followed a similar path, ruling that a 
private nursing home’s transfer or discharge of Medicaid patients 
“without notice or an opportunity for a hearing”53—decisions that re-
47 Id. at 362 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 366 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
50 See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine:  The 
Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 405 (1997) (“The Jackson 
Court’s approach to state nexus analysis was duplicated in the Court’s 1982 decisions 
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn and Blum v. Yaretsky.” (footnotes omitted)). 
51 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
52 Id. at 840-43. 
53 457 U.S. 991, 993 (1982). 
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duced the patients’ federal benefits—did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, either.54  Justice Brennan’s dissent in Blum accused the 
majority of running afoul of Burton by “ignoring the nature of the 
regulatory framework presented by this case in favor of the recitation 
of abstract tests and a pigeonhole approach to the question of state 
action.”55
Cases like Shelley and Burton validate the idea that state action may 
be found lurking behind things as seemingly private as housing cove-
nants or restaurant management decisions; the acknowledgement or 
discovery of government influence in such factual circumstances 
evolves out of the Court’s flexible, cumulative approach, in which fac-
tors are combined to meet the threshold of state action.  In contrast, 
the cases from Moose Lodge forward increasingly require much more 
overt state involvement, with the Court resolving ambiguities in favor 
of private actors.  “After the twin decisions in Blum and Rendell-Baker, if 
the totality approach was not dead, it was at least gasping for breath.”56
The ongoing debates regarding state action may be explained by 
the fact that few legal doctrines engage the philosophical impulse as 
fully as do questions of due process or equal protection.  The Four-
teenth Amendment was passed quickly on the heels of the lengthy and 
destructive Civil War, and the breadth of the Amendment’s applica-
tion continues to divide scholars and Justices.  Perhaps, as one com-
mentator has argued, the doctrine cuts even deeper: 
The Fourteenth Amendment remains the great Rorschach test of one’s 
underlying jurisprudential beliefs.  For those of a “progressive” bent, the 
amendment is a “sweeping mandate,” while those more inclined toward 
powdered wigs and judicial formalism criticize the amendment as an in-
strument of “freewheeling [judicial] lawmaking.” . . . The result is not 
54 Id. at 1012. 
55 Id. at 1013-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
56 Buchanan, supra note 50, at 406.  Interestingly, a third state action opinion was 
also handed down on June 25, 1982.  In that case, the Court did find state action, over 
dissents by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, the respective authors of the 
majority opinions in Rendell-Baker and Blum.  See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922, 942 (1982) (finding state action in the joint participation by state and private par-
ties in an attachment proceeding mandated by state law).  Justices White, Blackmun, 
and Stevens, each of whom had declined to find state action in both Rendell-Baker and 
Blum, found the facts of Lugar more persuasive, and they constituted the Lugar major-
ity with Justices Brennan and Marshall.  The Court’s posture in this era thus reflected 
strong adherents on both sides of the debate (with Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist least likely to find state action and Justices Brennan and Marshall most 
likely to find it), and a more pliable group of moderate Justices whose opinions were 
somewhat more “in play” on a case-by-case basis. 
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merely a meandering precedent of inconsistent verdicts, but a serious 
epistemological quandary that leaves one to wonder what values are to 
be assigned to “close nexus” and “entwinement,” and how future jurists 
should apply such precedent.
57
In recent years, the Supreme Court has welcomed intercollegiate 
and scholastic athletic associations into the state action thicket.  Hav-
ing traced the historical development of this contentious area through 
the early 1980s, the balance of this Comment will address how the 
doctrine has been applied in these athletic contexts, and will conclude 
by suggesting a course for future application. 
II.  ATHLETIC ASSOCIATIONS AND STATE ACTION 
A.  Shark Hunting 
1.  Background and Procedural History 
In the world of college sports, where the most prominent players 
change every few years due to graduation, loss of eligibility, and pro-
fessional opportunities, the real “stars” are usually the head coaches.  
Particularly in basketball, where top coaches’ careers can provide 
them with thirty or more years in the public spotlight, frequent media 
attention, and increasingly lucrative salaries and endorsement deals, 
in some ways the coaches define the sport.58
57 Michael A. Culpepper, Casenote, A Matter of Normative Judgment:  Brentwood and 
the Emergence of the “Pervasive Entwinement” Test, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1163, 1163-64 
(2002) (footnotes omitted). 
58 This status, long implicitly understood by college basketball fans, has led to 
some prominent coaches becoming national celebrities, as evidenced by the prolifera-
tion of “inspirational” books published by big-name coaches over the past few years.  
Examples include Duke Coach Mike Krzyzewski (LEADING WITH THE HEART:  COACH 
K’S SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BASKETBALL, BUSINESS, AND LIFE (2001)); onetime 
Kentucky and current Louisville coach Rick Pitino’s SUCCESS IS A CHOICE:  TEN STEPS 
TO OVERACHIEVING IN BUSINESS AND LIFE (1998); and Tarkanian’s own memoir, supra 
note 1.  The visibility of these and other top coaches has created a situation in which 
the leader of a university’s basketball program is often the most visible public figure 
representing that school, further amplifying the financial relevance of ensuring fair-
ness in NCAA enforcement proceedings, which can potentially cripple an athletic pro-
gram.  The National Association of Basketball Coaches (NABC) exists to promote the 
college game and the role of the coach within it.  For information regarding the  
NABC and its view of coaches as “Guardians of the Game,” see What Is the NABC and 
What Does it Do, http://nabc.cstv.com/about/about-basicinfo.html (last visited Mar. 
23, 2007). 
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Although he is now retired from coaching, Jerry Tarkanian (a.k.a. 
“Tark the Shark”) was for many years one of the most recognizable 
figures in college sports.  After a successful career on the high school 
and junior college levels, his teams won 778 Division I college games 
(509 of them during his nineteen-year tenure at the University of Ne-
vada-Las Vegas), reached four Final Fours, and won the 1990 NCAA 
national championship.59  Many of his players went on to great ac-
claim as professionals,60 and he was always well respected by his fellow 
coaches,61 but throughout his career, Tarkanian’s unconventional ap-
pearance, idiosyncratic courtside behavior, and off-court issues did 
even more to make him famous than did his coaching success. 
By far the most prominent of these controversies was his lengthy 
battle with the NCAA.62  It began in 1972, when Tarkanian was the 
coach at Long Beach State University.  Protesting what he considered 
to be unfair selective prosecution of recruiting violations by the NCAA 
enforcement group, Tarkanian wrote two newspaper columns in the 
Long Beach Independent Press-Telegram accusing the NCAA of picking on 
smaller schools while turning a blind eye to violations at prominent 
programs, most notably the University of Kentucky.63
59 See TARKANIAN WITH WETZEL, supra note 1, at xv, 221-22. 
60 Players like Larry Johnson, Stacey Augmon, Greg Anthony, Sidney Green,  
Armon Gilliam, and Reggie Theus each played ten or more seasons in the NBA  
after playing for Tarkanian at UNLV.  For a list of players who attended UNLV before 
playing professionally in the United States, see NBA/ABA Players who Attended Uni-
versity of Nevada--Las Vegas, http://www.databasebasketball.com/players/ 
bycollege.htm?sch=University+of+Nevada+%2D+Las+Vegas (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
61 See, e.g., Bob Knight, Foreword to TARKANIAN WITH WETZEL, supra note 1, at ix 
(“There is no one I have observed in my 40 years of coaching who has been able to do 
a better job of [getting his players to play hard on the court] consistently than Jerry 
Tarkanian.”). 
62 See generally PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW:  TEXT, 
CASES, PROBLEMS 742-43 (3d ed. 2004) (detailing Tarkanian’s conflicts with the 
NCAA); YAEGER, supra note 2, at 195-248 (same). 
63 See YAEGER, supra note 2, at 200 (quoting one of Tarkanian’s columns:  “The 
University of Kentucky basketball program breaks more rules in a day than Western 
Kentucky does in a year. . . . The NCAA just doesn’t want to take on the big boys”).  
The Kentucky program, long reputed to be among the “dirtiest” in the sport, was even-
tually placed on probation in the late 1980s following an episode in which an over-
night envelope, sent by an assistant coach and addressed to prospective recruit Chris 
Mills, inadvertently came open and revealed $1500 in cash, in clear violation of the 
NCAA’s amateur guidelines.  Tarkanian, who attempted to recruit Mills to play for him 
at UNLV, contends that schools like Kentucky (the program that has won the most 
games in college basketball history) and UCLA (which has won the most national 
championships) got away with many such recruiting violations over several decades, 
while less-prominent colleges-–including those at which he coached-–were targeted by 
NCAA enforcement.  TARKANIAN WITH WETZEL, supra note 1, at 147-49; see also John P. 
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When Tarkanian left Long Beach to become the head coach at 
the University of Nevada--Las Vegas in 1973, the NCAA was already in-
vestigating the UNLV program.64  This investigation, which culmi-
nated three years later, eventually led to charges that the school had 
committed thirty-eight different rules violations, ten of which named 
Tarkanian.65  When, in 1977, the University and Tarkanian appealed, 
the NCAA Council upheld the Infractions Committee’s findings.66  
The NCAA placed UNLV on probation for two years and also made an 
unprecedented move, ordering the University to suspend its coach for 
two years or face additional penalties.67  Nevada law required UNLV-–
a state institution—to hold a hearing prior to suspending the coach, 
but “[a]lthough the hearing officer did not believe that any violations 
had occurred, he concluded that UNLV had no choice but to suspend 
Tarkanian if the school wanted to remain part of the NCAA.”68
Before he could be suspended, Tarkanian sued the university in 
Nevada state court, alleging that he had been deprived of property 
and liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection:  What’s Left After National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association v. Tarkanian, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988)?, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621, 
621 n.1 (providing details on the Kentucky case). 
64 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 742.  The investigation, which had been 
inactive before Tarkanian took the UNLV job, was reopened within a week of his arri-
val on the UNLV campus.  The first entry into the investigatory file was a newspaper 
clip reporting Tarkanian’s new job.  YAEGER, supra note 2, at 201. 
65 See YAEGER, supra note 2, at 201 (providing details regarding the NCAA’s Offi-
cial Letter of Inquiry and hearings conducted by its Committee on Infractions).  Yae-
ger’s book goes into exhaustive detail about the NCAA’s investigatory policies, which 
he continually characterizes as being unfair and vindictive.  Looking closely at the spe-
cifics of the NCAA procedures, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For 
present purposes, it is enough to stipulate that the NCAA’s procedures fall well short 
of constitutional standards of due process, a claim that no one would be likely to deny.  
See infra notes 67 & 89 (discussing the inadequacies of the NCAA’s procedures). 
66 YAEGER, supra note 2, at 202. 
67 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 743.  The main charges against Tarkanian 
were that he paid for a player’s flight home, that he arranged for a player’s grade to be 
changed to maintain his on-court eligibility, and that he had pressured witnesses to 
give false statements to investigators.  Id. at 742-43.  The evidence presented against 
Tarkanian consisted entirely of hearsay testimony by NCAA investigators.  Id. at 743.  
No oral examination or cross-examination of witnesses was allowed, and the NCAA en-
forcement staff was granted a private consultation with the Council in between the 
presentation of evidence and the rendering of the verdict.  Id.; see also Tarkanian v. 
NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Nev. 1987) (discussing the inadequacy of the NCAA’s ad-
judicatory practices, including its reliance on investigators’ mere oral recollections of 
source interviews and the interviewees’ inability to check the accuracy of the eviden-
tiary memoranda). 
68 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 743 (emphasis added). 
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Amendment.69  After the trial court enjoined the suspension, UNLV 
appealed; the NCAA was subsequently joined as a party, at its own re-
quest.70  Tarkanian then filed an amended complaint, adding the 
NCAA as a defendant.  After four years of delays, during which Tar-
kanian remained the active head coach at UNLV, he won a bench 
trial.  The court found that the NCAA’s conduct qualified as state ac-
tion and that its decision had been arbitrary and capricious.71  After 
Tarkanian filed a petition to recover attorney’s fees and the NCAA 
was ordered to pay ninety percent of the $196,000 due him, the NCAA 
appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court; UNLV did not join in that 
appeal.72
The Nevada Supreme Court also found that the NCAA qualified 
as a state actor, at least insofar as the suspension of Tarkanian was 
concerned.73  In doing so, it relied in large part on the fact that “many 
NCAA member institutions were either public or government sup-
ported,”74 and that, because the right to discipline a public employee 
“is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state,” UNLV could 
not delegate that duty to a private entity.75  Upon the NCAA’s appeal, 
the case finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1988, some fifteen 
years after the initial NCAA investigation of UNLV had commenced. 
2.  The Coach at the Highest Court 
Justice Stevens authored the Court’s 5-4 majority opinion, which 
reversed the Nevada Supreme Court and held that the NCAA did not 
function as a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.76  The 
majority’s analysis declined to follow the liberal precedents estab-
lished most broadly in Shelley and Burton, and instead continued along 
the much more restrictive lines of Moose Lodge, Jackson, and their more 
recent progeny.  In doing so, the Court rejected Tarkanian’s claims 
one by one, unwilling to consolidate the various elements of his case 
against the NCAA into a single, cumulatively powerful argument. 
69 Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1346. 
70 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 188 (1988). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 189. 
73 Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1349. 
74 Id. at 1347. 
75 Id. at 1348. 
76 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988). 
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Tarkanian claimed that UNLV, clearly a state actor, created a co-
operative arrangement with the NCAA by delegating to the Associa-
tion exclusive authority to discipline UNLV’s coach.  Since the NCAA 
was now a joint actor with the state university, on this theory, the 
NCAA enforcement proceedings became state action.  This seemed to 
be a strong argument; in fact, even Jackson’s restrictive test77 could ar-
guably be met on the facts presented.  But, far from finding a “close 
nexus” between the NCAA and UNLV, the Court held that Tar-
kanian’s joint action claim “fundamentally misconstrue[d] the facts of 
this case.”78  The Court was convinced that UNLV had acted under 
color of state law.  But while the NCAA’s behavior was clearly influen-
tial in determining how the university would act, it was the school it-
self, not the national association, that suspended Tarkanian.  There-
fore, the majority argued, “the question is not whether UNLV 
participated to a critical extent in the NCAA’s activities, but whether 
UNLV’s actions in compliance with the NCAA rules and recommen-
dations turned the NCAA’s conduct into state action.”79  By focusing 
on the technical fact that the NCAA had no direct power to discipline 
Tarkanian, the Court effectively minimized the obvious truth that 
UNLV was largely bound by economic necessity to follow the NCAA’s 
“recommendations” of punishment.80
The Court also relied upon the fact that the NCAA, as a national 
association, was composed of institutions from many different states.  
For the majority, the fact that almost all of those schools were located 
outside Nevada, and that NCAA rules, propagated by its collective 
membership, were therefore independent of any one state, made Tar-
kanian’s claim that the NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law a 
nonstarter.81
77 “[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the 
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter 
may fairly be treated as that of the State itself.”  Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 
345, 351 (1974). 
78 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192. 
79 Id. at 193. 
80 Because the NCAA is composed of member institutions, not individuals, its au-
thority does not explicitly extend to “ordering” suspensions of coaches.  As the Tar-
kanian fact pattern shows, however, the NCAA does wield a great deal of coercive 
power over its member schools.  For a discussion of the financial stakes involved, see 
THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 7; Rovell, supra note 7.  Of course, further motiva-
tion to keep Tarkanian on the sidelines came from the kinds of visibility issues ad-
dressed in note 58, supra. 
81 See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194 (“‘Whatever de facto authority the [private stan-
dard-setting] Association enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it by any 
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Refusing to recognize the substantive reasons that led the univer-
sity to discipline its coach, despite his success and an investigation by 
the school that revealed no wrongdoing, the Court made this argu-
ment regarding the dilemma UNLV faced: 
UNLV retained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and establish 
its own standards.  The university alternatively could have stayed in the 
Association and worked through the Association’s legislative process to 
amend rules or standards it deemed harsh, unfair, or unwieldy.  Neither 
UNLV’s decision to adopt the NCAA’s standards nor its minor role in 
their formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding that the NCAA 
was acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated standards 
governing athlete recruitment, eligibility, and academic performance.
82
This analysis bespeaks the Court’s adherence to rigid tests for de-
termining whether a private party may be held to be a state actor.  “By 
strictly concentrating on determining if UNLV’s suspension of Tar-
kanian was under color of Nevada law or under NCAA rules for pur-
poses of state action, the Court necessarily trivialized the substantial 
claims advanced by Tarkanian that he was unfairly deprived of fun-
damental interests.”83  Most importantly, by abandoning consideration 
of the human interests at stake in favor of a strict analysis of the de-
gree to which the Nevada government was involved, the Court violated 
the spirit of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which has gener-
ally provided guarantees of due process and equal protection rights 
for U.S. citizens.84
The Court insisted that UNLV had a real choice in whether to fol-
low the NCAA’s punishment recommendations, and it held that the 
school never delegated to the NCAA any power to discipline its 
coach.85  Both of these points may be factually correct, but neither re-
flects the substantive context within which the school found itself.  
NCAA investigations and enforcement proceedings were the only rea-
sons why Tarkanian was in any trouble at all with UNLV, and the uni-
versity’s financial health depended on maintaining NCAA member-
ship.  When push came to shove, the NCAA had all of the power.  The 
government . . . [.]’” (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
U.S. 492, 501 (1988) (alterations in original))). 
82 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194-4-95 (footnote omitted). 
83 Sahl, supra note 63, at 654. 
84 See id. (arguing that, had the Court paid more attention to “the alleged inter-
est[s] at stake,” it could have lowered the risk that “basic values of human dignity, such 
as notice and a fair hearing, [would be] abused”). 
85 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 195-96 (“UNLV delegated no power to the NCAA to take 
specific action against any university employee.”). 
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Court’s reluctance to deal with these realities makes its opinion en-
tirely dependent upon formalistic criteria. 
“[M]ost experts [agree] that there is no viable alternative to the 
NCAA for successfully marketing athletic programs.”86  That was true 
in 1977, when UNLV faced the prospect of increased sanctions if it 
failed to show cause why Tarkanian should not be suspended; it was 
true in 1988, when the Court ruled in favor of the NCAA in this case; 
and it is even more clearly true in 2007, given the financial explosion 
in college basketball during the last two decades.87
The only real awareness of this substantive context was visible be-
tween the lines of the majority opinion.  Justice Stevens’s opinion ar-
gues that not only were UNLV and the NCAA not joint actors in the 
suspension, but they “acted much more like adversaries than like 
partners engaged in a dispassionate search for the truth.”88  That opin-
ion assumes, of course, that the NCAA proceeding was in fact a legiti-
mate attempt to uncover “the truth” in the first place.  Given that 
UNLV did conduct its own internal investigation into the charges lev-
eled against the basketball program, and especially given the degree 
to which NCAA procedures fail to meet the kinds of due process stan-
dards that Fourteenth Amendment protections would have required,89 
the Court seems to have placed the university in an untenable posi-
tion:  If UNLV cooperates with the NCAA and suspends its coach, the 
school is implicitly consenting to the Association’s practices, many of 
which UNLV might otherwise find lacking.  If, on the other hand, the 
school challenges the validity of the NCAA’s findings, then UNLV in 
effect places itself on probation, having already ceded its disciplinary 
authority to the NCAA.  In a sense, the real loser in this case is the 
university.  At least Tarkanian himself had his day in court—indeed, 
86 Sahl, supra note 63, at 623. 
87 For a discussion of the NCAA’s financial growth in recent years, see supra  
note 7. 
88 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196. 
89 Tarkanian alleged, inter alia, the following due process infirmities:  the Commit-
tee on Infractions failing to “inform Tarkanian of its practices and procedures and mis-
leading Tarkanian about an adversarial hearing so that he was unrepresented at the 
hearing” and “rel[ying] on the unsworn recollections of an NCAA investigator as truth-
ful and consider[ing] all evidence to the contrary as untruthful without standards or 
guidelines regarding the burden of proof”; an NCAA Committee member “decid[ing] 
that Tarkanian was wrong before the actual hearing”; and “the NCAA secretly tap[ing] 
their conversations with Tarkanian or UNLV representatives in violation of state laws.”  
Sahl, supra note 63, at 654 n.205 (citing 2 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW 
AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES:  COMMON ISSUES IN AMATEUR AND PROFES-
SIONAL SPORTS 80-81 (1986)). 
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he had several.  While it is certainly true that a school may have a con-
flict of interest in finding its own coach or program innocent of rules 
infractions, one would think that fact should lead the Court toward re-
quiring constitutional standards of due process, not away from it. 
The dissent in Tarkanian, written by Justice White and joined by 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O’Connor, simply found the NCAA to 
be a state actor because it acted jointly with UNLV in the suspension.90  
Justice White’s dissent offers three main reasons why this “joint ac-
tion” should be sufficient to bring the NCAA under constitutional due 
process guidelines.  “First, Tarkanian was suspended for violations of 
NCAA rules, which UNLV embraced in its agreement with the 
NCAA.”91  In other words, the NCAA set up the rules, and the alleged 
breaking of those rules was the sole reason for the coach’s suspension.  
“Second, the NCAA and UNLV also agreed that the NCAA would 
conduct the hearings concerning violations of its rules.”92  The dis-
senters clearly recognized that UNLV had, in fact, delegated some de-
gree of authority to the NCAA enforcement proceedings.  “Third, the 
NCAA and UNLV agreed that the findings of fact made by the NCAA 
at the hearings it conducted would be binding on UNLV.”93  Not only 
did the Association dictate the procedures to be employed, but the 
school agreed to be bound by them, with no right of appeal; that is, 
UNLV agreed “to accept the NCAA’s findings of fact as in some way 
superior to [the school’s] own.”94  These three elements, added to-
gether, convinced the four dissenters that Tarkanian deserved the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections. 
From the Tarkanian dissent, one can see how, if a Court were in-
clined to favor precedent like Burton, UNLV could have been deemed 
a state actor under state nexus analysis.95  In the alternative, an appli-
cation of public function analysis, grounded in an understanding of 
how completely UNLV, a state actor, delegated its authority to the 
“private” NCAA, could have also yielded a victory for Tarkanian.96  
90 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 203 (White, J., dissenting).  Both the majority and dissent 
agreed that UNLV was itself a state actor.  “A state university without question is a state 
actor.”  Id. at 192. 
91 Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 201. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
95 See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text (discussing state nexus analysis). 
96 For a discussion of public function analysis and delegation of authority, see su-
pra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
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However, because of the “meandering precedent of inconsistent ver-
dicts”97 that has plagued state action doctrine, the Court was free to 
choose its own precedential authority from among various strains, 
some of which are seemingly incompatible with one another. 
B.  Post-Tarkanian Developments 
1.  State Inaction 
In the immediate aftermath of the Tarkanian decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court further refined its position regarding state action in 
one especially poignant case.  In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services, the Court declined to find state action in the 
case of a boy who was severely beaten by his custodial father.98  Al-
though county social workers were aware of persistent child abuse, 
they took no action to secure the boy’s safety; eventually he suffered 
permanent brain injuries.99  The boy, along with his mother (who had 
not been living with her son during the abuse), sued the county and 
its Department of Social Services for depriving him of his liberty with-
out due process.100  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
found that, despite the tragedy of the case, the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed “to protect the people from 
the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each 
other.”101
Rejecting the majority’s approach, Justice Brennan in dissent as-
serted that the state’s affirmative intervention into the boy’s life 
through a child-protection program created a duty to protect him, 
and that Shelley and Burton “suggest[ed] that a State may be found 
complicit in an injury even if it did not create the situation that caused 
the harm.”102  More pointedly, Justice Blackmun’s separate dissent re-
buked the Court for its “sterile formalism”103 and compared its ap-
proach—claiming that its hands were tied by settled law—to that of 
97 Culpepper, supra note 57, at 1164. 
98 489 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1989). 
99 Id. at 193. 
100 Id. at 191, 193. 
101 Id. at 196. 
102 Id. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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“the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves.”104  Justice 
Blackmun’s chief complaint was the Court’s attempt 
to draw a sharp and rigid line between action and inaction.  But such 
formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of the broad and 
stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . On the contrary, the 
question presented by this case is an open one, and our Fourteenth 
Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depend-
ing upon how one chooses to read them.
105
Implicitly acknowledging that the decision to follow precedent is 
rarely value neutral, Justice Blackmun’s dissent in DeShaney contrasts 
sharply with the formalistic approach to state action that the Court fa-
vored throughout the Rehnquist era.  Justice Blackmun’s approach is 
unusual for its frank admission that, at least in the state action realm, 
stare decisis does not always dictate a result.  To acknowledge that 
members of the Court may, in fact, choose to interpret a doctrine 
broadly or narrowly runs counter to the ideal of a limited judiciary, 
and exposes Justice Blackmun to charges of “judicial activism.”  But no 
matter how one feels about such ideological critiques, Justice Black-
mun’s DeShaney dissent is refreshing for its candor, and it should be 
applauded by any who favor flexibility over formalism on the Court. 
However, Justice Blackmun would soon leave the Court, as would 
the pair of stalwart progressive Justices, Brennan and Marshall.  By the 
middle of the 1990s, nearly half of the Tarkanian Court had retired, 
and while the newer Justices did not always cater to progressive ideals, 
the Court’s turnover in personnel did leave state action doctrine 
somewhat open for reevaluation. 
2.  “Entwinement”:  An Expansionist Return? 
In Brentwood Academy v. Tenneseee Secondary School Ass’n, the Court 
moved away from the restrictive analysis that had been so dominant 
for three decades when it held that the Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association (TSSAA), an organization of member schools that 
regulates high school sports within that state, was indeed a “state ac-
tor.”106  Justice Souter’s majority opinion took the “close nexus” test 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 212-13. 
106 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 305 
(2001).  The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari again in Brentwood, but not on 
the state action issue; this time the Court will address the merits of the constitutional 
claims.  Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007). 
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used in Jackson107 as an invitation to make a “normative judgment” 
where “the criteria lack rigid simplicity.”108  Adding to the multitude of 
tests it has employed in state action cases, the Court in Brentwood held 
“that the association’s regulatory activity may and should be treated as 
state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school offi-
cials in the structure of the association,” in part because there was “no 
offsetting reason to see the association’s acts in any other way.”109
The standard employed in Brentwood, then, clearly marks two 
changes from the Court’s previous state action decisions.  First, it rec-
ognizes, as did Justice Blackmun’s DeShaney dissent, that the act of 
judging is sometimes more art than science.  That the regulatory activ-
ity “may and should be treated as state action” sounds much different 
from the blindly formalistic pronouncements of the more restrictive 
cases, wherein questions were generally answered “yes” or “no,” with 
little gray area left open for discussion.  Second, by explicitly balanc-
ing different sides of an issue, the Brentwood standard allows substan-
tive concerns to play a role in the adjudication of state action ques-
tions.  To speak of “no offsetting reason” to see things another way 
strongly implies that some other fact pattern may present such a rea-
son.  This flexibility alone distinguishes Brentwood from most of its 
contemporary state action predecessors.  The key point, and the rea-
son why Brentwood may signal a reevaluation of state action as it applies 
to the NCAA, is that “Justice Souter took the conception and test of 
the state action doctrine decidedly back in the direction of the intui-
tive, ad hoc doctrine of the pre-Rehnquist Vinson and Warren 
Courts.”110
As with Tarkanian, the dispute in Brentwood began with allegations 
of illegal recruiting of athletes.  The football coach at Brentwood 
Academy, a private Christian high school in a Nashville suburb, was 
accused of violating TSSAA rules by, among other things, inviting 
promising eighth graders to visit a practice and giving some students 
free tickets to Brentwood games.111  After finding that the school’s ac-
tions violated recruiting rules, the TSSAA placed Brentwood on four 
years’ athletic probation, banned its football and basketball teams 
107 See supra note 77 (explaining the nexus test). 
108 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295. 
109 Id. at 291. 
110 Alan R. Madry, Statewide School Athletic Associations and Constitutional Liability; 
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 12 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 365, 391 (2001). 
111 WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 753-54. 
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from the playoffs for two years, and fined the school $3,000.112  Brent-
wood then sued the TSSAA in federal court, alleging that enforce-
ment of the recruiting rules was state action and in violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.113  Brentwood prevailed on a mo-
tion for summary judgment, with the district court ironically relying 
on a footnote from Tarkanian suggesting that statewide interscholastic 
athletic associations actually were state actors.114  On appeal, the TSSAA 
won a reversal, with the Sixth Circuit holding that the district court 
had erred in finding a symbiotic relationship between the State and 
the Association.115
Justice Souter’s majority opinion surveyed the various factors that 
the Court had at times found dispositive in assessing the existence of 
state action, noting that previous cases had 
identified a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribu-
tion.  We have, for example, held that a challenged activity may be state 
action when it results from the State’s exercise of “coercive power,” when 
the State provides “significant encouragement, either overt or covert,” or 
when a private actor operates as a “willful participant in joint activity with 
the State or its agents.”  We have treated a nominally private entity as a 
state actor when it is controlled by an “agency of the State,” when it has 
been delegated a public function by the State, when it is “entwined with 
governmental policies,” or when government is “entwined in [its] man-
agement or control.”
116
Having summarized the history of state action doctrine, the Brent-
wood majority then declined to force the facts of the case into a pre-
fabricated portal.  Instead, Justice Souter’s opinion bespeaks a com-
mitment to substantive evaluation on a case-by-case basis, a method far 
removed from the judicial formalism to which the Court had rather 
faithfully adhered up through Tarkanian and DeShaney.  In fact, in 
112 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 293. 
113 Id. 
114 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 
682 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).  The Tarkanian footnote reads, in pertinent part:  “The situa-
tion would, of course, be different if the membership consisted entirely of institutions 
located within the same State, many of them public institutions created by the same 
sovereign.”  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 n.13 (1988).  This formal difference 
seems to have provided Justice Stevens with a reason sufficient to find state action in 
Brentwood, in which he joined the majority opinion, as distinct from Tarkanian.  Be-
cause both cases found the Court mired in 5-4 splits, in a limited sense the Brentwood 
decision actually does rest on formalist grounds. 
115 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766 
(6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
116 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (citations omitted).
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Brentwood the Court seems to weigh factors and decide that the TSSAA 
should be treated as a state actor, for the most part, simply because 
there’s no reason not to do so:  “The nominally private character of 
the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public 
institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and 
there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional 
standards to it.”117
Rather than err on the side of the private actor via some formalis-
tic approach based on precise definitions, Justice Souter applies due 
process safeguards almost as a default, since there seems to be no rea-
son why doing so would be unfair, given the entwinement of public 
and private in the case.  In place of the predictable but inflexible doc-
trine advanced by Justice Rehnquist from Moose Lodge through De-
Shaney, the Brentwood Court endorses a method of analysis in which 
the facts of the case itself play a larger role in its outcome.  From the 
perspective advanced herein, this is obviously a welcome change. 
Justice Thomas wrote the dissent in Brentwood, in which Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined.118  Unsurpris-
ingly, given the history of the debate on the state action issue, the dis-
sent focused on the need for less flexible criteria.  Justice Thomas 
opined in the first paragraph that the Court had “never found state 
action based upon mere ‘entwinement,’”119 and in the last paragraph 
complained that “the scope of [the] holding is unclear.”120  In a direct 
response to Justice Thomas’s complaints, Justice Souter articulated 
the perspective shared by those past jurists who had favored a more 
flexible approach to state action by arguing that “if formalism were 
the sine qua non of state action, the doctrine would vanish owing to the 
ease and inevitability of its evasion, and for just that reason formalism 
has never been controlling.”121
The most interesting aspect of the Thomas dissent is buried in a 
footnote.  However, like the footnote in Tarkanian’s majority opinion 
that was later used by the district court in Brentwood, Thomas’s foot-
note could also point to future developments in state action doctrine, 
though probably not in a direction of his choosing.  Justice Thomas 
found Justice Souter’s state action criteria to be so broad that it actu-
117 Id. at 298 (emphasis added). 
118 Id. at 305-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
119 Id. at 305. 
120 Id. at 314. 
121 Id. at 301 n.4 (Souter, J.). 
  
1294 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1269 
 
ally called the viability of Tarkanian into question:  “[I]t is not difficult 
to imagine that application of the majority’s entwinement test could 
change the result reached in [Tarkanian], so that the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association’s actions could be found to be state action 
given its large number of public institution members that virtually 
control the organization.”122  That prospect, unwarranted as it may be 
from Justice Thomas’s perspective, will be addressed, and indeed ad-
vocated, in the next Section of this Comment. 
III.  WHERE SHOULD THE COURT GO FROM HERE? 
A.  An Adaptive Analytical Model 
The most basic conflict between the conservative, formalistic ap-
proach and the more progressive, fact-based approach to state action 
revolves around how much one values legal predictability as compared 
with flexibility.  A bright-line doctrinal approach will always lead to 
more certainty in the law, but, like the powerful but plodding seven-
foot center who appears lost when drawn out away from the basket by 
a quicker opponent, the formalist cannot easily adjust to “game” cir-
cumstances.  By contrast, the Brentwood approach promises to be more 
adaptable, albeit at the cost of some doctrinal certainty. 
College athletics has now become so financially relevant, and im-
portant in so many ways to the lives of students, coaches, administra-
tors, alumni booster organizations, and legions of fans that a more 
adaptive doctrine is required.  Therefore, the Supreme Court should 
look afresh at the NCAA, and do so in light of the Brentwood approach.  
It should be remembered that this approach is not “new;”123 it is just 
from a different precedential line than the one followed by most re-
cent Court decisions.  Overly formalistic conceptions of state action 
have essentially given the NCAA a free pass to operate in a self-
regulated environment when it comes to its enforcement proceedings, 
and the Association’s track record reveals an inability to function fairly 
in such a context.  Granted, the prospects for the progressive move 
advocated here may be dim in the short term, particularly if Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito maintain their generally 
122 Id. at 314 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
123 “[I]n accepting background involvement to be sufficient for finding state ac-
tion, Brentwood Academy seems more of a piece with [Burton] . . . than recent state ac-
tion decisions.”  Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 
1415 n.166 (2003). 
  
2007] THE NCAA AS STATE ACTOR 1295 
 
conservative judicial philosophies during their tenures on the Su-
preme Court.  However, there is much at stake in the state action 
question that should be conceptualized in politically neutral ways.  
One should also remember that, once confirmed, Supreme Court Jus-
tices do not inevitably follow the anticipated ideological lines for 
which they were presumably appointed.124
Even if conservative ideology does dominate the Court in the com-
ing years, leading to a more restrictive state action doctrine, there is 
no logical reason why the NCAA deserves a “bye” when it comes to 
due process and equal protection.  Indeed, recent events have dem-
onstrated more than ever that a hard-line “law and order” approach to 
enforcing rules on the collegiate level should point first toward re-
form of the NCAA. 
For examples one need look no further than two recent, well-
publicized cases.  One involved the former head basketball coach at 
Baylor University who, in an effort to deflect attention away from his 
own misdeeds, attempted to cover up one of his players’ criminal re-
sponsibility for the murder of a former teammate by fabricating a 
story that painted the deceased student-athlete as a drug dealer.125  
The other is a longtime controversy regarding the former head 
women’s basketball coach at Penn State University, who is alleged to 
have imposed a de facto ban on lesbian players on her team.126  Obvi-
124 The most recent example of this phenomenon would be Justice Souter, whose 
decisions on the Court have disappointed most conservatives.  Other examples include 
Justice Stevens (generally among the more liberal voices on the current Court), Justice 
Blackmun (author of many conservatives’ least favorite opinion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973)), and, paradigmatically, Chief Justice Warren (under whose leadership the 
Court extended civil rights legislation to unprecedented levels between 1953 and 
1969).  Each of these four men joined the Court as Republicans, having been ap-
pointed by Republican Presidents. 
125 Barry Horn, How a Career Unraveled:  NCAA Report Reveals Depth of Bliss’ Efforts to 
Cover Up Violations, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 24, 2005, at 1C.  Coach Dave Bliss 
resigned in disgrace.  The NCAA responded by punishing the Baylor players who re-
mained, canceling the team’s nonconference schedule and placing the program on 
five years’ probation.  See also Matt Fulks, Beyond the Stats:  A Long Way from Baylor to Bismarck, 
KCMETROSPORTS.COM, http://kcmetrosports.com/articles/article.asp?aid=2702&full=-1 (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2007) (criticizing the NCAA for its response to the problems at 
Baylor).  Following his ignominious exit from Baylor, Bliss briefly coached profession-
ally in the minor league Continental Basketball Association, resigning after one losing 
season as the head coach of the Dakota Wizards.  W.H. Stickney, Jr. & Brian 
McTaggart, Around Sports, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 23, 2006, at 2. 
126 Coach Rene Portland was recently sued in federal court for alleged discrimina-
tion against a former player based on that player’s sexual orientation.  Press Release, 
Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, National Center for Lesbian Rights Files Federal Dis-
crimination Lawsuit on Behalf of Former Penn State Basketball Star Jennifer Harris:  
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ously, most cases of misconduct in and around college sports do not 
reach this level of seriousness, but when even a single player endures a 
lengthy procedure in which he is ruled ineligible,127 or when a coach 
is dismissed for allegedly making improper payments to a recruit,128 
the consequences are serious enough to insist on a fair and open fo-
rum for adjudication. 
If these and countless other recent examples mean anything at all, 
they point to the need for a stronger governing body.  But, for the 
NCAA to function effectively, it must be fair.  In order to increase the 
public perception of fairness-–thereby legitimizing the Association’s 
role in these matters-–and to engender confidence in the thousands 
of athletes and coaches who fill stadiums and generate millions of dol-
Complaint Names Coach Rene Portland, Athletic Director Tim Curley, and Penn State 
as Defendants (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.clubs.psu.edu/up/ 
psupride/articles/Federal%20Lawsuit%20Press%20Release%2012212005.pdf.  In the 
wake of a university investigation conducted after the suit was filed, Portland was fined 
$10,000, threatened with dismissal should further violations occur, and instructed to 
undergo “diversity and inclusiveness” training.  The lawsuit was settled in early 2007, 
and Portland resigned her position soon thereafter.  Penn State’s Portland Makes “Diffi-
cult” Decision to Quit, ESPN.COM, Mar. 22, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
ncw/news/story?id=2808075.  Although Portland’s animosity toward lesbian players 
has been public knowledge at least since 1986, id., and despite Penn State’s eventual 
reprimand, the NCAA never disciplined her or her school’s program in any way. 
127 For example, Kentucky freshman center Randolph Morris accepted expense 
money from NBA teams when it appeared he would be leaving college basketball, but 
then he went undrafted in the 2005 NBA player draft.  When Morris applied to re-
enter school, initially he was ruled permanently ineligible to play basketball.  Then he 
was ushered through a number of appeals processes, and again ruled ineligible.  Fi-
nally, he was allowed to play after missing the first fourteen games of the 2005-2006 
season.  NCAA Reduces Morris’ Suspension to 14 Games, ESPN.COM, Dec. 15, 2005, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2260113&type=story.  In contrast, the 
NCAA acted very quickly-–in a matter of days-–when a violation occurred involving 
USC’s Heisman Trophy-winning quarterback Matt Leinart and an unauthorized ESPN 
promotional advertisement.  NCAA Reinstates Leinart After ‘Inadvertent’ Violation, 
ESPN.COM, Dec. 21, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2267624&type=story.  
Such discrepancies raise questions about why some NCAA investigations drag on for 
years while other disputes are resolved so quickly.  Of course the stigma of being pub-
licly “under investigation” is punishment in itself. 
128 For example, Ohio State University fired head basketball coach Jim O’Brien in 
2004 when school officials discovered that he had lent $6,000 to a potential recruit.  
Although O’Brien had a clause in his contract ensuring that he could not be fired for 
rules infractions absent an NCAA ruling, Ohio State dismissed the coach without any 
findings from the NCAA.  O’Brien Denies He Gave Ohio State Grounds for Firing, 
ESPN.COM, Dec. 14, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2259096&type=story.  
Still awaiting an NCAA ruling, O’Brien sued Ohio State and was awarded $2.4 million 
in damages.  Ohio State Appeals $2.4 Million Award to O’Brien, ESPN.COM, Sept. 16, 2006, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2590492&type=story. 
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lars in revenue for its member schools and conferences, the NCAA 
should be held to due process and equal protection standards. 
B.  Balancing Uniformity with Diversity 
The NCAA is a peculiar blend of diverse institutions, and in many 
ways this diversity is responsible for the strength and popularity of in-
tercollegiate sports.  However, if fair competition is to remain a possi-
bility, at some level the member schools must abide by a uniform set 
of guidelines.  How should the desire for fair competition be balanced 
against both the rights of each institution to police itself and the 
benefits and protections provided to the student-athletes and 
coaches?  This is a major dilemma facing intercollegiate sports; how 
one feels about Tarkanian and similar cases depends in part on where 
one thinks that line between collectivity and autonomy ought to be 
drawn. 
NCAA bylaws mandate minimum academic standards for students 
to maintain athletic eligibility, and all member schools must comply.129  
But many schools and conferences go well beyond the minimum 
standards, meaning, in effect, that schools content with meeting only 
the minimum requirements may have a significant competitive advan-
tage when it comes to some academically weak prospects.  Conversely, 
certain schools that have higher academic reputations (Duke and 
Stanford being preeminent among them in the basketball world) 
probably win some recruiting battles because of the perception that 
such schools will better prepare those players who do not make the 
NBA for alternative careers in their adult lives.  These kinds of differ-
ences among institutions seem unobjectionable.  Unless we want to 
foster a system that drastically circumscribes the boundaries within 
which academic institutions are allowed to prioritize athletics, it seems 
that the current system is sufficient as to academic standards. 
But what of the ways in which schools police their own athletes 
and coaches?  A wide variation in approaches to dealing with internal 
disciplinary matters may be found at the highest levels of intercolle-
giate sports.  For example, the men’s basketball programs at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina and the University of Connecticut have a 
great deal in common.  They are both led by iconic coaches, they each 
draw upon a tradition of excellence on the court, and they have each 
129 NCAA, Eligibilty, http://www.ncaa.org (follow “Academics & Athletes” hyper-
link; then follow “Student-Athlete Eligibility” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
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recently won multiple NCAA basketball championships.130  The 
schools part ways, however, when it comes to their responses to recent 
legal troubles surrounding their programs. 
In the spring of 2004, high school senior and prospective North 
Carolina recruit JamesOn Curry-–who had, more than a year earlier, 
accepted a scholarship to play for his home-state Tar Heels-–became 
the leading high school scorer in the rich basketball history of that 
state.  However, when he was later arrested as part of a local sting op-
eration and charged with selling a small amount of marijuana (a 
charge that Curry later admitted was true), North Carolina head 
coach Roy Williams revoked Curry’s scholarship offer.131  Curry’s legal 
troubles meant that he would never be allowed to enroll at the school 
of his choice, even though he had been promised a full scholarship to 
attend. 
Curry later matriculated at Oklahoma State University, a school 
that had never recruited him before his legal troubles began, but 
where he excelled as a freshman on a prominent, nationally ranked 
team.132  Owing to the presence of four other stars who would each 
soon leave college early to become wealthy professional players, North 
Carolina was able to win the national championship in 2005 even 
without Curry.133  So, perhaps it was not a great sacrifice for the talent-
rich Tar Heels to take a hard line in Curry’s case.  However, if he had 
been a member of their team in the following season, he would have 
been one of the best players on an inexperienced roster.  The deci-
sion to revoke his scholarship thus does have a lasting impact for the 
North Carolina program, to say nothing of the program at Oklahoma 
State.  More importantly, one wonders whether the same decision to 
revoke the scholarship would have been made by a different coach, at 
a different school, in a different context.  If not, should the NCAA 
strive to mandate a uniform policy in such cases, or is this scenario 
better handled within the confines of each member school? 
130 Connecticut won championships in 1999 and 2004; North Carolina won titles 
in 1993 and 2005.  NCAASports.com, History—Past Champions, http://ncaasports.com/ 
basketball/mens/history/divi (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
131 See Thayer Evans, Cowboys’ Curry Makes Most of Second Chance, WASH. POST, Mar. 
15, 2005, at D7 (quoting Curry on North Carolina:  “Carolina is a great university. . . . 
They did what they had to do.  I respect them for that.  It’s a decision they had to 
make.”). 
132 Id. 
133 Keith Parsons, Twenty-nine Years Later, May Matches his Father’s Title, 
http://www.ncaasports.com/basketball/mens/gamecenter/recap/NCAAB_20050404_NC@IL 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
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During the summer of 2005, two Connecticut players were ar-
rested for stealing laptop computers from a dormitory on campus.  
They each admitted to the offense.  One of them, junior point guard 
Marcus Williams, was among the top backcourt players in the nation, 
with a near-certain future in the NBA.  Connecticut coach Jim Cal-
houn responded to Williams’s offense with a half-year suspension, 
forcing the star player to miss eleven games at the start of the season, 
a period during which Connecticut went undefeated while playing a 
relatively weak nonconference schedule.  Williams then returned to a 
starting role for the Huskies,134 who later advanced to the “Elite Eight” 
of the NCAA Tournament. 
Calhoun’s relatively lenient treatment of Marcus Williams con-
trasts with his full-year suspension of the other player involved with 
the theft, freshman A.J. Price.  Privacy issues regarding the two play-
ers’ involvement in the crime make it difficult to assess their relative 
culpability, but the disparate punishment raises questions regarding 
the school’s treatment of student-athletes.  If Price had been a veteran 
player, would he have received as harsh a punishment?  Or, if a less 
prominent member of the team had been involved, would he, like 
Williams, have been allowed to keep his scholarship?  Again, is this an 
area where the need to maintain fair standards of competition among 
member schools warrants NCAA involvement? 
These two cases are by no means identical, but both North Caro-
lina and Connecticut are public universities (and therefore state ac-
tors), both annually recruit the finest high school prospects in the 
country, and both produce more than their share of professional stars.  
Their responses to these legal issues also represent the kind of institu-
tional variance in punishment that makes for the appearance of com-
petitive imbalance.  Is this an area in which institutional diversity 
should be allowed to govern, or does the NCAA need to enforce some 
kind of uniformity when it comes to disciplining athletes with criminal 
backgrounds?  To what degree is it fair to insist on a level playing field 
among competitors? 
134 See Gregg Doyel, Huskies Take Risk, Williams Brings Results, CBS  
SPORTSLINE.COM, Jan. 22, 2006, http://www.cbs.sportsline.com/collegebasketball/ 
story/9180364 (calling Coach Calhoun “the most powerful man in Connecticut” and 
saying that Williams’s renewed eligibility “was worth every bit of political capital Cal-
houn could muster”).  Williams has since entered the NBA, having been drafted in the 
first round by the New Jersey Nets.  NBA.com, Nets Sign First-Round Picks Williams 
and Boone,  http://www.nba.com/nets/news/netswilliamsboone_060712.html (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
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These questions have no easy answers.  On the one hand, conflict-
of-interest concerns are obviously present whenever a school is al-
lowed the final word on its own athletes’ punishments.  On the other, 
many schools would likely withdraw from a national association before 
allowing it to interfere too much in admissions and other eligibility 
determinations.  Even if such issues fall outside the appropriate realm 
for national uniformity, and even if broad policies regarding member-
ship in the NCAA may not have direct constitutional implications, the 
complexity of these and other questions points toward the need for 
more procedural safeguards to protect the rights of all concerned.  
However one feels about these issues, there are surely limits to the 
value of this type of diversity among schools.  There must be some 
point at which we need to compare apples with apples, instead of try-
ing to impose the same guidelines on institutions or sports that do not 
actually have that much in common. 
These issues have drawn the attention of Jay Bilas, a national 
commentator on college basketball who is also an attorney.  Bilas ar-
gues that “[t]he NCAA needs to have ‘sport-specific’ rules that make 
practical sense for each specific sport.”135  He argues, for example, 
that it is “patently absurd to have the same rules apply to a field 
hockey player that apply to a basketball player.”136  He advocates draw-
ing the line between sports based on purely economic differences in 
revenue generation, a change that would further isolate football and 
men’s basketball from other intercollegiate sports.137  How much do 
football and men’s basketball dominate in terms of revenue genera-
tion at the major college level?  The University of Michigan’s athletic 
program generated $44.2 million during the 1997-1998 academic 
year;138 among Big Ten universities, ninety-five percent of the total 
athletic department revenue came from those two sports alone.139
135 Jay Bilas, Good Guards, Bad Shooting and Worse Rules, ESPN.COM, Dec. 17, 2005 
(on file with author).  Bilas graduated from Duke University School of Law after play-
ing collegiate basketball as an undergraduate there; he now balances a law practice 
with a seasonal job analyzing college basketball for ESPN.  See  Moore & Van Allen, At-
torney Profile of Jay S. Bilas, http://www.mvalaw.com/AttDetails.php?id=19 (last vis-
ited Mar. 23, 2007).  Bilas’s article offers a number of other useful perspectives regard-
ing NCAA enforcement proceedings, the use of scholarship reductions as punishment 
for rules violations, and the accountability of coaches. 
136 Bilas, supra note 135. 
137 Id.  Regarding the revenue generation of college basketball, see the discussion 
supra note 7. 
138 DUDERSTADT, supra note 4, at 136 tbl.1. 
139 Id. at 138.  The NCAA is not directly involved in the bowl system governing big-
time college football; consequently, the great majority of its operating budget depends 
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This Comment has dealt with only a select few of the issues facing 
intercollegiate athletics, but there is no shortage of instances in which 
the NCAA becomes involved in legal battles.  For example, a recent 
class action lawsuit filed on behalf of some 20,000 former student-
athletes has challenged the NCAA’s scholarship standards, seeking “to 
prohibit the NCAA from telling member colleges they cannot offer 
athletic scholarships up to the full cost of attendance.”140  The suit ac-
cuses the NCAA of collusion amounting to $117 million in damages, 
an amount that could be trebled under antitrust law to $351 million 
should the NCAA lose the case.141  While this suit may not turn on the 
state action question directly, it, like Tarkanian, obviously does raise 
issues regarding the NCAA’s ability to dictate policy to its member in-
stitutions.  If this or a similar lawsuit challenging the NCAA’s authority 
were to reach high enough, the Supreme Court may well seize an-
other opportunity to define the NCAA in relation to basic constitu-
tional standards.  If and when that happens, it will be interesting to 
see whether Tarkanian is treated as controlling precedent, or if Brent-
wood signaled a sea change in the Court’s state action doctrine. 
C.  Back to the Future? 
Clearly, the NCAA has plenty of work to do, and as intercollegiate 
athletics continues to grow in popularity and profitability, the Associa-
tion will undoubtedly face new challenges.  However, none of its ini-
tiatives, no matter how necessary and well meaning, will garner sig-
nificant public support unless the Association itself is perceived to be 
fair.  Ultimately, nothing could do more to help the NCAA, and inter-
collegiate sports in general, than to require the Association to meet 
Fourteenth Amendment procedural guidelines.  Despite the doctrinal 
confusion in the area, the NCAA should be considered a state actor. 
on men’s basketball.  For example, of the $422 million NCAA budget for 2002-2003, 
nearly eighty-eight percent ($370 million) came from the Association’s new 11-year, 
$6.2 billion deal with CBS for rights to televise the men’s basketball tournament.  THE 
BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 7, at 459. 
140 Tom Farrey, NCAA Might Face Damages in Hundreds of Millions, ESPN.COM, Feb. 
21, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2337810&type=story.  Unlike 
other students who receive scholarships, student-athletes are not permitted to receive 
any funds for “incidentals such as phone bills and travel expenses,” due to NCAA regu-
lations.  Id.  The lawsuit, White v. NCAA, was filed on February 17, 2006, in federal 
court in Los Angeles.  Id. 
141 Id.  The complaint filed in White v. NCAA in the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California is available at http://www.voluntarytrade.org/ 
downloads/6P09_Complaint.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). 
  
1302 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1269 
 
Thankfully, a legal paradigm for this doctrine already exists.  It 
comes from a different era, before college sports became quite such 
big business.  In the mid-1970s, before the Supreme Court first con-
sidered the issue in Tarkanian, federal circuit courts twice ruled that 
the NCAA was a state actor.  In 1975, the Fifth Circuit held in Parish v. 
NCAA that “by taking upon itself the role of coordinator and overseer 
of college athletics—in the interest both of the individual student and 
of the institution he attends—[the NCAA] is performing a traditional 
governmental function.”142  The court went even further, arguing that 
the Association was so public that “were the NCAA to disappear to-
morrow, government would soon step in to fill the void.”143  If the 
public function prong of state action doctrine is to have any teeth at 
all, it is hard to see how any private organization could be required to 
meet a higher standard than that one.  Moreover, if the NCAA’s pub-
lic relevance was anywhere near that level in 1975, it is surely much 
more so today. 
Later that same year, in Howard University v. NCAA, the D.C. Cir-
cuit cited both the expansive Burton and the restrictive Jackson rulings 
as controlling precedent.144  The court ruled that the NCAA and its 
member schools “are joined in a mutually beneficial relationship, and 
in fact may be fairly said to form the type of symbiotic relationship be-
tween public and private entities which triggers constitutional scru-
tiny.”145
Interestingly, the circuit courts in both Parish and Howard foresaw 
the kind of circumstance that would come before the Supreme Court 
in Tarkanian.  Speaking to the delegation issue, the courts argued that 
“it would be strange doctrine indeed to hold that the states could 
avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the Constitution by band-
ing together to form . . . a ‘private’ organization to which they have 
relinquished some portion of their governmental power.”146
The perspectives advanced in these pre-Tarkanian opinions should 
be resuscitated by the Supreme Court today.  It is time for college ath-
letes and their coaches to be protected from overzealous enforcement 
142 506 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1975). 
143 Id. at 1033. 
144 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
145 Id. at 220.  The court also characterized the NCAA as being “impregnated with 
a governmental character.”  Id. 
146 Id. (quoting Parish, 506 F.2d at 1033).  For further discussion of Howard, Parish, 
and other issues related to the NCAA and state action in the 1970s, see Sahl, supra note 
63, at 640-45. 
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procedures that, while they may be well intentioned, too often run 
afoul of basic fairness.  It is also time for the NCAA to renew itself in 
the public eye.  A demonstrably above-board enforcement process 
would go a long way toward rehabilitating the Association’s poor pub-
lic image, and would in turn bolster confidence in the legitimacy of 
intercollegiate sports in general.147
CONCLUSION 
Whether the Court’s analysis is to be based on public function, 
state nexus, pervasive entwinement, or any combination of tests, the 
NCAA operates in such a way that warrants it being treated as a state 
actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.  As this Comment has ar-
gued, the NCAA functions as a quasi-governmental body.  The mem-
ber institutions—many of them public and therefore unquestionably 
state actors themselves—delegate a large degree of authority to the 
private NCAA.  Its member schools are virtually forced to comply with 
NCAA rulings, as the option of leaving the Association is practically 
out of the question.  The potential for abuse is clear, and the mecha-
nistic reasoning of Tarkanian, which is unduly permissive toward 
NCAA procedures, should not be followed. 
Brentwood’s emphasis on fact-specific determinations instead of 
rigid, formalistic rules provides a template for how the Court could 
define the status of the NCAA.  Though it concerns an association of a 
different kind, Brentwood-style jurisprudence could easily be applied to 
a Tarkanian-type case.  To do so would benefit all concerned, by pro-
tecting coaches and athletes from discriminatory or otherwise unfair 
enforcement proceedings and by restoring credibility to the NCAA it-
self.  Too many important issues exist within the NCAA’s purview, and 
too much is riding on their fair disposition, for anything less than 
constitutional protections to apply. 
Justice delayed is better than nothing, and in 1998 Jerry Tarkanian 
finally settled his claims against the NCAA for $2.5 million.148  By then, 
he had outlasted most of the investigators who had worked so hard to 
147 In any event, the NCAA’s “enthusiasm for fighting corruption in college sports 
is partly driven by the fear of federal intervention.”  College Sports Get a Warning, supra 
note 8, at A20.  Were such federal intervention (and its consequent “entanglement”) 
to occur, the NCAA would probably be much more likely to be considered a state ac-
tor. 
148 TARKANIAN WITH WETZEL, supra note 1, at 204. 
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end his career.  Bringing an end to the long conflict, NCAA President 
Cedric Dempsey issued a statement reading, in part: 
The NCAA regrets the 26-year ongoing dispute with Jerry Tarkanian and 
looks forward to putting this matter to rest.  Obviously, Jerry Tarkanian 
has proven himself to be an excellent college basketball coach, and we 
wish him and his family continued success for the remainder of his ca-
reer.  We know that this dispute has caused distress for all concerned.  
We sincerely hope that by resolving this conflict, wounds can begin to 
heal.
149
The agreement left Tarkanian feeling like a winner, but also dis-
appointed that the settlement received little media coverage.150  He 
eventually retired in 2002. 
In November 2005, the coach returned to Las Vegas to be hon-
ored by UNLV at a special dedication ceremony.  The Rebels’ home 
floor at the Thomas & Mack Center will henceforth be known as 
“Jerry Tarkanian Court.”151  Given the percentage of his career that 
was spent tied up in litigation, one wonders how many of those pre-
sent to honor the retired coach on that night truly grasped the doubly 
appropriate nature of that phrase. 
 
149 Id. 
150 Tarkanian writes in his memoir: 
To me this was total vindication.  It couldn’t have gone better. . . . The NCAA 
investigated us for seven years, and they didn’t come up with one single major 
violation.  Not one.  After all that time.  They had to pay me $2.5 million.  
They had to admit they were wrong.  The president of the NCAA had to issue 
that statement.  And it barely got any attention at all. 
Id. 
151 UNLV Dedicates Jerry Tarkanian Court, ESPN.COM, Nov. 26, 2005, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2237913&type=story. 
